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THE 1959 LABOR LAW: RIGHTS & REMEDIES
OF THE UNION MEMBER
JOHN M. ORBAN*
The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959'
was enacted subsequent to the exposition of abuses, corruption,
breaches of trust and disregard of the rights of union members as
disclosed in the investigation" conducted by the Select Committee
on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field.
The Act (LMRDA) is the result of the combination and radifica-
tion of several bills. The reporting requirements, trusteeship provis-
ions and election provisions are taken from the bill introduced by
Senator Kennedy. The sections which involve the fiduciary obliga-
tions of union officers are taken from the Elliott bill. Title I, the Bill
of Rights, originally espoused by Senator McClellan, is a modifi-
cation' of his proposals.'
TITLE I
Title I guarantees to the union member certain rights not
formerly cognizable in federal courts absent diversity jurisdiction.
In addition to these rights, the individual member may have a cause
of action under Sections 304(a), 501(b) and 609 which also will be
briefly discussed. 5
Section 101 (a) (1). This subsection' of Title I insures to each
member equal rights and privileges to nominate candidates, vote7
in union elections, attend membership meetings, and to participate
in the deliberations and voting upon union business subject to
reasonable rules and regulations in the union's constitution and by-
laws. The rights here involved are limited to four. It is to be noted
that the equal rights provision of the McClellan Amendment used
7 N. Dak. Bar Ass'n., attorney, U1. S. Dept. of Labor, Los Angeles, Calif. The views
and opinions expressed herein are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect those of
the Dept. of Labor.
An effort has been made to present briefly the statutory rights and remedies of the union
member and a reference to a few practical problems that may arise. In addition, appli-
cable case law has been included (to November 1960). For an extensive treatment in-
cluding, inter alia, the reporting requirements and trusteeship provisions, see Aaron, The
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 851 (1960).
1. 73 Stat. 519. The act will be referred to by section number only.
2. Act, §§ 2(a), (b), (c).
3. Hickey, The Bill of Rights of Union Members, 48 Geo. L.J. 226 (1959).
4. Sherman, The Individual Member and the Union: The Bill of Rights Title in the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 54 Nw. U. L. Rev. 803 (1960).
5. See also § 403 in regard to elections and existing rights and remedies.
6. 73 Stat. 522.
7. Section 401 (e) provides that, "Each member in good standing shall be entitled-
to one vote."
38 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VoL. 37
the word "including". Thus, by deletion of this word the provis-
ions for equal rights are specifically limited."
It is clear not only from the express language of the statute but
from the authority of several decisions in the district courts that it
is only the relationship of a member vis-a-vis the union that is
protected.9
In Jackson v. Martin Company,"0 plaintiff alleged a denial of his
rights under certain statutory safeguards. It was held that the court
was without jurisdiction because it was plaintiff's status as a com-
mitteeman, and not the union-unionmember relationship that was
involved (even though plaintiff was incidentally a union member).
Plaintiff's action was similarly dismissed in Byrd v. Archer" in
which a wrongful denial by defendant of the right to be a candidate
for the office of delegate to the Buildings Trades Council was al-
leged.
Strauss v. Teamsters12 involved a dismissal of plaintiff as busi-
ness agent under a mistaken interpretation by the union of Section
504 of the Act.1" It was held that the rights embodied in Title I
deal with ". . . the membership in general and their relationship,
as members, with the union."
In Johnson v. Local Union,'4 a motion to dismiss as to non-mem-
bers was sustained because actions under Title I require union
membership.
In Bennett v. Local 701," plaintiff alleged the wrongful discharge
from employment as a field representative for the union. The court
stated that the legislative history is clear that the purpose of Title I
is to protect union members and not the employer-employee rela-
tionship.
Probably of more moment and certainly more nebulous will be
the judic ial determination of what is a reasonable rule or regulation.
For example, in a local union with a mixed membership, it may be
a reasonable limitation that only those who are directly concerned
8. Sherman, supra note 4 at 813.
9 Shei'man, spura note 4 at 813, 814.
10. 1'80 F.Supp. 475 (D.Md. 1960).
11. 38 CCH Lab. L. Rep. para. 66,083 (S.D. Cal. 1959)..
12. 38 CCH Lab. L. Rep. para. 66,073 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
13. Section 504 prohibits persons who have been convicted of robbery, bribery, extor-
tion, embezzlement, grand larcency, burglary, arson, violation of narcotics laws, murder,
rape, assault With intent to kill, assault which inflicts grevious bodily injury, or a violation
of Title II or 'III of the Act, or conspiracy to commit such offenses, or who has been a
member of the Communist party, from holding certain union offices. This prohibition is
limited to five years after the conviction or membership.
14. 181 F Supp. 734 (E.D. Mich. 1960).
15. 39 CCH Lab. L. Rep. para. 66,183 (D. Ore. 1960).
THE 1959 LABOR LAW
with a specific issue could vote on that issue.'" Again, it may be
reasonable to deny the right to vote to a member who is in arrears
in payment of dues,'- or until he has completed a period of appren-
ticeship,'" or if he is retired. To the contrary, it would probably be
unreasonable to deny the right to vote to a member who is employ-
ed on a part-time basis only, or if he is only a temporary employee.
Certainly, the creation of a class of non-voting members would be
contrary to the express provisions of the Act.1
The Secretary of Labor has issued a regulation2 1 which states
that, "A labor organization may, however, prescribe reasonable rules
and regulations with respect to voting eligibility". Due to the
citation of Section 101 (a) (1) in the regulation, it seems, according
to Professor Cox,2 1 that this was so worded to avoid an inconsistency
between Sections 101 (a) (1) and 401 (e), although the latter sec-
tion specifically provides that each member in good standing2 is
entitled to one vote.
The legislative history of the Act discloses that the status of a
non-member seeking admittance to the union is not protected. An
effort to include such protection was rejected with the defeat of the
Powell Amendment which would have extended certain safeguards
to minority groups and to non-members seeking to obtain member-
ship in the union.2"
Section 101 (a) (2). This subsection provides that every member
shall have the right to meet and assemble freely with the other
members; to express views and opinions; and at union meetings, to
express opinions on candidates or upon union business, subject to
established rules and regulations of the organization as to the con-
duct of the meeting. A proviso assures the union of the right to
adopt and enforce reasonable rules as to the member's responsibility
toward the union and to his refraining from conduct that would
interfere with the performance of the legal and contractual obliga-
tions of the union . 2
Thus it is fair to say that the union may place reasonable restric-
tions, but not prohibitions, upon the members in respect to the ex-
16. Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959, 58
Mich. L. Rev. 819 (1960).
17. See 401 (e) in respect to dues check-off.
18. 29 C.F.R. J 452.10 (1959).
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Cox, supra note 16 at 834, n.52.
22. Section 3 (o) defines a "member in. good standing".
23. 105 Cong. Rec. 14,388 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1959).
24. Powell, The Bill of Rights- Its Impact Upon Employers, 48 Geo. L. Rev. 270, 274
(1959).
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pression of their opinions, by virtue of the proviso in 101 (a) (2).
It is to be noted here that although the rules must be establish-
ed as reasonable, there is no requirement that they be embodied
in the constitution or by-laws as is the case in 101 (a) (1). In ad-
dition, the delimiting of rights by reasonable rules is limited to oc-
currences at meetings. The only restriction upon the right to meet
and assemble and to express views etc., other than at union meet-
ings, is found in the proviso which would permit reasonable rules to
proscribe any action of the members that would adversely affect
the union as an institution.
One case has dealt with this subsection. In McFarland v. Build-
ing Material Teamsters,25 plaintiff made a motion at a union meet-
ing to suspend the business agent to await the outcome of the trial
of the business agent on an indictment for bribery. The union's
constitution provided for a trial, before removal, under such cir-
cumstances. It was held that the refusal of the president to put
plaintiff's motion to a vote was not a violation of 101 (a) (2).
Section 101 (a) (3). Local unions are prohibited from raising dues
and initiation fees and no special assessments shall be levied, so
provides subsection 101 (a) (3). The exception to this prohibition
is, in the case of a local union, if an increase in dues is approved by
a majority vote of the members in good standing by secret ballot in
a general or special membership meeting or in a membership refer-
endum. If the former method is to be utilized, reasonable notice
that such a matter is to be voted upon is a prerequisite. -
A practical consideration for a local union involves action by an
international union to increase the amount to be paid to it by its
locals. There would appear to be nothing in 101 (a) (3) that would
prevent such action. However, the matter to be resolved by the
local is whether to increase the share of the dues paid to the inter-
national union or to resort to an increase in dues through the
methods prescribed by this subsection -.27
In Brooks v. Local 30,218 plaintiffs alleged a violation of 101 (a) (3)
because in an election by secret ballot to raise the dues of the local
union, the ballot was ambiguous. It provided for a reduction of
dues from seven dollars to five dollars plus ten cents per hour
(which would have increased the dues). The court stated that
25. 180 F.Supp. 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
26. This subsection also provides for an increase in dues by labor organizations other
than locals or federations of national or international labor organizations.
27. Cox, supra note 16 at 835.,
28. 41 CCH. Lab. L. Rep. para. 16,583 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
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since there was no showing that anyone was misled by the alleged
ambiguity, plaintiffs' action should be dismissed.
Section 101 (a) (4). This subsection insures to the union member
the right to sue. In addition, he is protected should he desire to
communicate with a legislator or to petition the legislature. One of
the two provisos in this subsection is, "That any such member may
be required to exhaust reasonable hearing procedures (but not to
exceed a four-month lapse of time) within such organization, before
instituting legal or administrative proceedings . . ."29
The constitutions of some unions compel the exhaustion of intra-
union remedies before a member may file suit against the union or
its officers. Such a provision should be contrary to public policy as
a restriction on the right to a judicial determination of a grievance.
However, the judicial doctrine which compels exhaustion of internal
remedies is a different matter. "
Senator Kennedy said in this respect that the purpose of this sub-
section is not to eliminate intra-union grievance procedures under
the constitution or by-laws of the union. Ile said that the body of
State and Federal case law which requires, or does not require, the
exhaustion of internal remedies is not meant to be affected.31
Several cases have been decided under this subsection. Rizzo v.
Ammond12 involved the challenging of the validity of a trusteeship.
A New Jersey district court held that the principle remedy is the
Secretary's and that the union member must comply with reasonable
rules and regulations so that before suit can be instituted, an intra-
union appeal must first have been perfected.
Johnson v. Local Union 33 involved a suit to enjoin an international
union from interference with the activities of the local and from
intimidating plaintiffs. The court held that subsection 101 (a) (4)
need not be complied with because of the existence of the elaborate
union appellate machinery and because the various appellate bodies
do not sit often enough, nor does the constitution or by-laws require
a decision within a certain time. This latter point, if it is to serve
as a precedent, poses a very practical problem for unions whose
constitution or by-laws do not contain a time limit for a determina-
tion of the question subsequent to the hearing.
29. It is further provided in this subsection, "That no interested employer or employer
association shall directly or indirectly finance, encourage, or participate in, except as a
party, any such action, proceeding, appearance, or petition."
30. Cox, supra note 16 at 839.
31. 105 Cong. Rec. 16,414 (daily ed. Sept. 3, 1959).
32. 182 F.Supp. 456 (D N.J. 1960).
33. 181 F.Supp. 734 (.D. Mich. 1960).
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In Tomko v. Hilbert," the court held that since the constitution
provided reasonable remedies that were not complied with, the
action should be dismissed. The court noted as exceptions to the
"exhaustion" rule that an intra-union appeal need not be under-
taken if the appeal cannot yield results, nor if the appeal is unduly
burdensome, nor if an irreparable injury to the member would re-
sult. It is thus probable that in these cases the courts will apply
usual equitable principles.
One question that could arise is: Is it a violation of 101 (a) (4)
as a limitation on the right to sue for a union to impose an assess-
ment (to pay for costs to the union) on a member for unsuccessfully
suing the union or the officers thereof. Senator Kennedy's state-
ment" that it is the intent of this subsection to permit a member
access to the courts without interference from the union would seem
to indicate that such an exaction could not be legally imposed even
if the due process guarantees of 101(a) (5) are complied with.
In addition, it would seem that suits initiated by the members are
in fact necessary for the existence and furtherance of good unionism
and that the expenses incurred in the defense of such suits are not
too high a price to pay for the disclosure of union affairs to mem-
bers who are sufficiently interested and militant to undertake the
expense and inconvenience of legal proceedings.
Section 101 (a) (5). The "due process" provision is contained in
this subsection which protects members from being "fined, suspend-
ed, expelled, or otherwise disciplined" except for non payment of
dues unless the member has been served with written charges, given
a reasonable time to prepare his defense and afforded a full and
fair hearing. Any constitutional provision or by-law inconsistent
with this section "shall be of no force or effect".
One writer has stated, and with apparent justification, that the
major failing of union disciplinary procedure is its failure to provide
an independent judiciary. "Union trial bodies are composed of
union members who typically have a special interest in the matters
before them, even if they are not actually prejudiced"."6 This is one
of the weaknesses to which Congress did not direct itself.
In Flaherty v. Steelworkers,- a California district court concluded
that plaintiffs' were premature in their assertion that they would be
unable to obtain a fair hearing because their appeal would be to the
34. 40 CCH Lab. L. Rep. para. 66,757 (W.D. Pa. 1960).
35. 105 Cong. Rec. 16,414 (daily ed. Sept. 3, 1959).
36. Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Harv. L,
Rev. 851, 874 (1960).
37. 41 CCH Lab. L. Rep. para. 16,517 (S.D. Cal. 1960).
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very people whom they have sued and that their right to sue was
infringed upon. The court stated that there had actually been no
hearing, and plantiffs had not been disciplined; thus no injury was
inflicted and plaintiffs must wait to see if the hearing is fair and
whether discipline will result.
In Gross v. Kennedy"' it was held that the removal of a union
member from his employment at the employers request is a disci-
plinary proceeding. Therefore, the due process requirements of
notice and a fair hearing must be afforded.
A determination by defendant union, in Jackson v. Martin Com-
pany, 9 that plaintiff should be disqualified as a committeeman un-
der section 504 is not "discipline" as contemplated by the Act. (In
addition, it was not the member's rights, as a member, that were
affected.)
In Detroy v. AGVA,45 a New York district court held that "other-
wise disciplined" included the placing of plaintiff's name on an "un-
fair" list when so, doing would deprive plaintiff of employment.
In Strauss v. Teamsters,4' plaintiff alleged wrongful discharge
from his position as business agent through a mistaken interpreta-
tion by the union of section 504. The court, in dismissing the com-
plaint, stated that plaintiff was not fined, suspended or expelled as
those words as used in 101 (a) (5) nor was he "otherwise disci-
plined". Plaintiff did not claim violation of a right based on his
membership. If anything, there was a breach of contract.
Actually, "due process" has been the subject of a substantial
amount of litigation prior to the enactment of LMRDA. The remedy
was already available; it was a "more practical" remedy that was
needed.4 2
Section 102. This section provides for the enforcement of Title I
rights and for federal jurisdiction. The aggrieved member may42
bring a suit in a U.S. district court in the district where the alleged
violation occurred or where the principal union office is located.
The cases which involve jurisdiction are several and varied.-
Thus, it has been held: that an employee of a union cannot-sue
under the Act and that there is no other basis for jurisdiction since
a federal question was not involved; 45 that the court did not have
38. 183 F.Supp. 750 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
39. 180 F.Supp. 475 (D. Md. 1960).
40. 41 CCH Lab. L. Rep. para. 16,563 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
41. 38 CCH Lab. L. Rep. para. 66,073 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
42. Cox, supra note 1 at 838.
43. Section 103 preserves rights and remedies under State and Federal Law.
44. These cases are not limited to actions under Title I.
45. Strauss v. Teamsters, 38 CCH Lab. L. Rep. para. 66,073 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
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jurisdiction of a mandamus action to compel an intra-union men-
bership transfer since that right is determined by the constitution of
the international and is not within the purview of Title 1;4a that
absent diversity, there was no basis for jurisdiction since Title I does
not guarantee the right to be a candidate for union office; 4 7 that the
court could dismiss a suit because of lack of personal jurisdiction
over an indispensable party, the president of the international or
the trustee appointed by him; 48 that the international union is an in-
dispensable party in an action by officers of a local to return the
local to the control of the elected officers thereof; 4 that there is no
jurisdiction, absent diversity, since administrative remedies have
not been exhausted;o that there is no jurisdiction simply because a
federal statute must be construed; "' and that there is no jurisdiction
over inter-union disputes on jurisdictional matters. -
It should be noted that in the McClellan Bill, the Secretary of
Labor was authorized to sue under Title I. However, as enacted,
the remedy is the member's. The only instance in which the Secre-
tary can sue under Title I is for a violation of Section 104 which re-
quires the unions to make available to members copies of collective
bargaining contracts. 53 The right of the Secretary to sue as set
forth in Section 210"4 is made specifically applicable to this section.
Section 609 and 610 of Title VI," should also be examined in con-
junction with Section 101 (a) (5). Section 609 makes it unlawful to
fine, suspend, expel or otherwise discipline any union member for
exercising any of his rights under the Act. This protection is prac-
tical since Section 102 is made applicable in the enforcement of
this Section. Section 610 imposes criminal sanctions on any person
who uses force or violence or the threat thereof, to restrain,. coerce
or intimidate any union member for the purpose of interfering with
or preventing the exercise of any right to which he is entitled under
the Act.
46. Hughes v. Local 11, International Ass'n of Bridge and Ornamental Iron Workers,
AFL-CIO, 183 F.Supp. 552 (D.N.J. 1960).
47. Byrd v. Archer, 38 CCH Lab. L. Rep. para. 66,083 (S.D. Cal. 1959).
48. Rizzo v. Ammond, 182 F.Supp. 456 (D.N.J. 1960).
49. Flaherty v. McDonald, 178 F.Supp. 544 (S.D. Cal. 1959).
50. Flaherty v. McDonald, 178 F.Supp. 300 (S.D. Cal. 1960).
51. Jackson v. Martin Co., 180 F.Supp. 475 (D. Md. 1960)
52. Local 33, International Hod Carriers v. Mason Tenders District Council, 40 CCH
Lab. L. Rep. para. 66,738 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
53. Allen v. Armored Car Chauffeurs and Guards, Local 820, Teamsters, 135 F.Supp.
492 (D.N.J. 1960).
54. "Whenever it shall appear that any person has violated or is about to violate any
of the provisions of this title, the Secretary may bring a civil action.
55. Title VI contains miscellaneous provisions: Investigations, Extortionate picketing,
Retention of Rights under other Federal and-State Laws, Effect on State Laws, Service of
Process, Administrative Procedure Act, Other Agencies and Departments, Criminal Con-
tempt and Separability Provisions.
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Consequently, appropriate criminal liabilities are provided for
preserving to the union member a practical remedy to correct the
infringement of his rights as protected by the Act.5 6
TITLE IV
Several other sections of the Act which relate to the member's
rights should be referred to. Title IV governs election procedures.
Subsection 402 (a) provides that a member who has exhausted
union internal remedies or who has invoked such remedies without
obtaining a final decision within three calendar months after their
invocation may file a complaint with the Secretary of Labor within
one calendar month thereafter alleging violation of Section 401.
The challenged election shall be presumed valid pending a final
decision.
If the member has not obtained a final decision within three
calendar months, he may file a complaint with the Secretary. Alter-
natively, he may await a determination and if it is unfavorable to
him, he may then within one month file a complaint.5s
If the complaint is filed and upon a finding by the Secretary that
a violation of Section 401 has occurred, he shall, within sixty days
after the filing of the complaint, file suit to set aside the invalid elec-
tion and to direct the conduct of a new one. The remedy provided
for challenging the validity of an election is exclusively that of the
Secretary.
One case held,-" in an action under Title I, that there was no
jurisdiction of plaintiff's claim because Title IV procedures provide
for challenging an election after the election. In Myers v. Operating
Engineers,"0 the court held that after union election misconduct,
there must be prompt action by the union member or the bill of
rights does not afford a remedy; but regardless, an election cannot
be set aside until after the member has applied to the Secretary.
TITLE III
Title III regulates trusteeships.1 Here also, the union member is
provided with an enforcement remedy. Subsection 304 (a) pro-
vides that upon written complaint from a member or subordinate
56. Aaron, supra note 36 at 877.
57. Section 403 preserves pre-election remedies but post election remedies belong ex-
clusively to the Secretary.
58. 29 C.F.R. § 452.15 (1959).
59. Byrd v. Archer, 38 CCH Lab. L. Rep. para. 66,083 (S.D. Cal. 1959).
60. Myers v. International Union of Operating Engineers, 40 CCH Lab. L. Rep. para.
66,436 (E.D. Mich. 1960).
61. Section 3 (h) defines trusteeship as, ". . . any receivership, trusteeship, or other
method of supervision or control whereby a labor organization suspends the autonomy
otherwise available to a subordinate body under its constitution or by-laws".
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labor organization alleging violation of Title III, the Secretary shall
investigate. If he has probable cause to believe that a violation has
occurred without being remedied, he shall bring an action for ap-
propriate relief. The subsection then provides that, "Any member
or subordinate body of a labor organization affected by violation of
this title . . . may bring a civil action in any district court .... "
The question has arisen, and has been the subject of judicial de-
termination, as to whether the administrative remedies vested in the
Secretary must first be exhausted before a member or subordinate
body may file suit under this subsection.
On the premise that Congress would not write into the law a
superfluous or non-existent remedy, it is submitted that the answer
to the problem is that the administrative remedy need not be ex-
hausted and that any requirement that it be so would lead to a
result wholly inconsistent with Congressional purpose and would
render the right of the union member nugatory.
This subsection provides that upon complaint by a member, the
Secretary shall investigate and upon a finding of probable cause,
institute suit. Section 306 provides that upon the filing of a com-
plaint by the Secretary, "the jurisdiction of the district court over
such trusteeship shall be exclusive and the final judgment . . . res
judicata."
Thus, the only circumstance under which a union member could
exercise his right to sue under this subsection is, if upon complaint
to the Secretary, the investigation ended in a determination of no
probable cause. However, if the Secretary does find probable cause,
then he must act and the court's jurisdiction becomes exclusive
thereby rendering useless the remedy that Congress provided to the
member or subordinate body.
Flaherty v. McDonald62 involved a suit under Section 304. The
action was dismissed because the administrative remedy (i. e., com-
plaint to the Secretary) provided had not been exhausted. The
court stated that the Secretary must determine the existence of a
violation before a member's suit may be instituted.
However, in Local v. IBEW,03 a Maryland district court held that
a determination of probable cause by the Secretary in trusteeship
matters is not a condition precedent to the institution of suit by the
individual member or by the local union. The court buttressed its
conclusion by extensive reference to the legislative history.
62. 183 F.Supp. 300 (S.D. Cal. 1960); see also Flaherty v. Steelworkers, 41 CCH
Lab. L. Rep. para. 16,517 (S.D. Cal. 1906).
63. Local 28, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. International Brother-
hood of Electrical Workers, 184 F.Supp. 649 (D. Md. 1960).
[VOL. 37
THE 1959 LABOR LAW
TITLE V
Section 501 (a) establishes certain fiduciary obligations of officers,
agents, shop stewards and other representatives of a union. Sub-
section (b) vests in the individual member the right to sue to re-
cover damages, secure an accounting or to obtain other appropri-
ate relief if the union or its officers, following a breach of their
fiduciary duties, refuse to act within a reasonable time after being
requested to do so. The proceeding by the member however, can
be brought only upon leave of court upon a verified complaint and
for good cause shown. The application may be ex parte. Provision
is also made for the awarding of expenses and- attorney fees as a
part of the recovery.
Assuming that unauthorized expenditures of union funds were
made prior to the enactment of the Act, the question arises as to
whether a union member has a cause of action under 501 (b). It
can be plausibly argued that, in the absence of a clear expression to
the contrary, the Act is not to be given a retroactive effect and
several decisions under other sections of the Act so state."
To the contrary, it could be argued, again quite plausibly, that
the element of retroactivity is not involved. Thus, if subsequent to
the enactment of the Act, union officers discover that union funds
were pilfered prior to enactment, it is incumbent upon them because
of their 501 (a) fiduciary obligations, to institute a suit for an ac-
counting, or damages. That they have a duty to protect union funds
is undeniable; that the funds were taken from the union treasury
prior to enactment is immaterial.65
Local 107 v. Cohen,66 the only case that has been passed on by an
appellate body,67 involved a suit for injunction to prohibit union
officers from further using union funds to pay for legal fees in the
defense of civil or criminal actions arising out of the alleged misuse
of the funds by such officers. Subsection 501 (a), in addition to the
provisions set forth above, provides that, "A general exculpatory
provision in the constitution and by-laws of such a labor organiza-
tion or a general exculpatory resolution of a governing body pur-
porting to relieve any such person of liability for breach of the
64. Flaherty v. United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, 41 CCH Lab. L. Rep.
para. 16,517 (S.D. Cal. 1960); Robertson v. Banana Handlers, International Longshore-
man's Ass'n, Local 1800, AFL-CIO, 183 F.Supp. 423 (E.D. La. 1960); Rizzo v. Ammond,
182 F.Supp. 456 (D.N.J. 1960); Smith v. General Truck Drivers, Local 467, Teamsters,
181 F.Supp. 14 (S.D. Cal. 1960).
65. For a comment on the fiduciary obligation, see Dugan, Fiduciary Obligations Under
the New Act, 48 Geo. L. Rev. 277 (1959).
Section 501 (c) provides criminal sanctions for e. g., embezzlement, conversion, etc.
66. Highway Truck Drivers, Local 107, Teamsters v. Cohen, 41 CCH Lab. L. Rep.
para. 16,603 (3rd Cir. 1960).
67. But see DeVeau v. Braistad, 40 CCH Lab. L. Rep. para. 66,583 (S.Ct. U.S. 1960).
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duties declared by this section shall be void as against public
policy". The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed an injunction
to prevent such officers from using union funds for legal expenses
in the actions against them. The court stated that although the reso-
lution (to vote funds) was not within the prohibition of 501 (a) it
was invalid because "it authorized action beyond the powers of the
union as derived from its constitution and was inconsistent with the
aims and purposes of the. . . Act".
CONCLUSION
The Act is the first step in the regulation of the labor unions' in-
ternal affairs and although the subject of considerable criticism it is
a far reaching, constructive effort to deal with certain basic prob-
lems. Only a few rights of action were created that did not pre-
viously exist, but the enactment of the law focused, indeed vividly,
the attention of union members and their attorneys on the existence
of such rights.6" This focusing of attention is of considerable import
since the accomplishment and completion of the objectives of the
Act lies primarily on individual action. If the members are suffi-
ciently diligent in effectuating the enforcement of these rights, there
should be, not only increased union "democracy", but, from the at-
torneys' vantage point, a substantial (though not as substantial as
some critics of the bill have indicated) increase in litigation. In
consequence, many attorneys may find it necessary to become famil-
iar with the complexities of labor law. Unquestionably, an atten-
tion directed to the development of LMRDA may be profitable not
only pecuniarily, but possibly in avoiding extensive, detailed re-
search in the future. But probably the most judicious counsel was
given in a recent bar association address. Professor Aaron 9 stated
that lawyers should, ". . . exert your efforts at the outset to find out
what the dispute is really about and settle it by agreement rather
than by litigation."
68. Cox, supra note 16 at 853.
69. Benjamin Aaron, Acting Director, Institute of Industrial Relations, University of
California. Address at Beverly Hills Bar Association luncheon.
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